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On 13 March 1981, the European Parliament referred the motion for a 
resolution tabled by Mr SUTRA and others on the taxation of wine <Doc. 1-18/81> 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure to the Committee on Agriculture 
as the committee responsible. 
At its meeting of 1/2 June 1981, the Committee on Agriculture decided to 
draw up a report and at its meeting of 20 October 1981 appointed Mr LIGIOS 
rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 24 September 1982 and 
1/2 February 1984. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 26 votes 
to 2 with 2 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Curry, chairman; Mr Fruh, 
Mr Colleselli and Mr Delatte, vice-chairmen; Mr Ligios, rapporteur; Mr Abens 
<deputizing for Mr Woltjer>, Mr Barbagli <deputizing for Mr Diana>, Mr Bocklet, 
Mrs Castle, Mr Dalsass, Mrs Desouches, Mr Gatto, Mr Gautier, Mr Goerens 
<deputizing for Mrs Martin), Mr Helms, Mr Herman <deputizing for Mr Clinton>, 
Mr Kaloyannis, Mr Kaspereit, Mr Kirk, Mr Maffre-Bauge, Mr Mertens, Mr Newton-
Dunn <deputizing for Mr Hord), Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Papapietro, Mr Provan, 
Ms Guin, Mr Simmonds, Mr Stella <deputizing for Mr Tolman>, Mr Thareau and 
Mr Vitale. 
The report was tabled on 2 February 1984. 
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A 
The Committee on Agriculture hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the taxation of wine 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SUTRA, :Mr GATTO, Mr FOTILAS, 
Mrs CRESSON, ~lr ARFE', Mr CARIGLIA, Mr GEORGIADIS and Mr COUTSOCHERAS 
<Doc. 1-18/81>, 
-having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 July'1983 in 
Case_170/78, Commission v. the United Kingdom1, 
- having regard to its resolution of 17 November 1983 on the harmonization of 
taxation in the Community2, 
- having regard to the report by the Committee on Agriculture <Doc. 1-1374/83), 
A. whereas consumers in certain non-producer Member States are disadvantaged 
by the fact that wine is subject to indirect taxes which make it a luxury 
product and make its consumption prohibitively expensive by comparison with 
other nationally produced alcoholic beverages such as beer, 
B. whereas some Member States use excise duties to discriminate against products 
from other Member States, 
C. whereas this situation has unfavourable effects both on consumer choice and 
the functioning of the common organization of the market in win~, with 
significant consequences for the Community budget, 
D. whereas in its judgment on Case 170/78, the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities stated that, by levying excise duty on still white 
wines made from fresh grapes at a higher rate, in relative terms, than on 
beer, the United Kingdom had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 95<2> of the EEC Treaty, 
E. whereas it is necessary to regularize the legal situation in the Community 
as soon as possible, by putting this judgment into effect throughout the 
Community through the introduction of appropriate legislative provisions 
by the Member States concerned, 
1
oJ No. C 226, 24.8.1983, p. 3 
2
oJ No. C 342, 19.12.1983, p. 73 5 PE 79.978/fin. 
1. Notes that the difference in per capita wine consumption- which varies 
from between 2 litres a year in ~reland to about 90 litres a year in 
France and Italy - is due not so much to differences in taste as to the 
existence of obstacles to the spread of consumption, such as high excise 
duties; 
2. Stresses that in some countries taxation often puts the price of even 
the most ordinary table· wine beyond the reach of the average consumer; 
3. Stresses that this policy cannot be justified even on budgetary grounds, 
since the revenue from excise duties on wine is insignificant as a result 
of its Limited consumption; 
4. Points out furthermore that this taxation of wine has unfavourable 
consequences for consumers, who are unable to purchase greater quantities 
of this product because of its high price, for producers, who are excluded 
by fiscal barriers from a large part of the Community market, and for the 
Community budget, which is burdened by surpluses caused by the restrictions 
on the free movement of the product; 
5. Shares the Court of Justice's view that there is a close competitive 
relationship between wine and beer in that the two beverages are capable 
of meeting identical needs and there is a degree of substitution for one 
another; 
6. Notes, however, that in some Community countries the tax burden on wine is 
greater than that on beer, whichever of the three possible methods of 
comparison is used- the volume, alcoholic strength or price of the product; 
in other Member States, however, beer is taxed more heavily than table wine; 
7. Stresses that this system of taxation penalizes wine when, as the Court 
of Justice points out, the tax policy of a Member State must not 
crystallize given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage 
acquired by national industries concerned to respond to them; 
8. Welcomes the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
on Case 170/78, Commission v. the United Kingdom, whose aim was to bring 
national Laws governing excise duties on light still wines into line 
with Community Law; 
PE 79.978/fin. 
9. Stresses the importance of the authority of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and its fundamental role as regards the 
respect of Community law by the Member States, who joined the 
European Economic Community of their own free will; 
10. Considers that the Court•s judgment, and the numerous resolutions by 
Parliament condemning excise duties on wine, show the need to seek 
a solution to this problem in the harmonization of the various tax 
systems; 
11. Calls therefore on the Commission to submit as quickly as possible new 
proposals for harmonizing the taxation of alcoholic products, taking 
account of the conclusions reached by the Court of Justice; 
12. Calls on those Member States which levy high excise duties on wine to 
comply immediately with the judgment of the Court of Justice,.by 
introducing provisions designed gradually to reduce these duties to 
a fairer level and one which does not discriminate against products in 
competition with wine; 
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission of the European Communities and the European consumer 
organizations. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Excise duties are an indirect tax levied on the production or sale of a 
commodity, which producers and retailers pass on by raising consumer prices. 
Excise duties now represent one of the principal obstacles t~ the free 
movement of some goods, particularly when they are used as an indirect tax 
Levied on certain products in order to favour other products. The 
most conspicuous instance of this discriminatory use of excise duties 
is without doubt that of wine. 
The po,r.pose of th1s report is to bring to the attention of the European 
Parliament and of European public opinion a problem which is serious 
not only in legal terms, but also, and above all, because of the conse-
quences which for too many years have affected European producers and 
consumers. 
The fact that per capita consumption of wine varies from 90 l a year 
in certain Member States (for example, France and Italy> to only 8 l 
a year in the United Kingdom and a mere 2 l in Ireland, that is between 
around twelve and more than fifty times Less, is explained not only 
by the differing tastes and traditions of certain nations - tastes 
and traditions which are universally recognized and which no-one wishes 
to eliminate or change. 
One of the causes of this substantial disparity in consumption must 
be sought in the excise duties which certain Member States use to give 
an excessive competitive advantage to beer <an alternative drink to 
wine> and hence to make wine prohibitively expensive. 
In certain countries, in fact, excise duties increase the price of 
wine to such an extent that it becomes a luxury product that can be 
afforded only by the most well-to-do. This is one of the most questionable 
forms of discrimination, particularly when it is practised in certain 
major countries whose consumer associations are among the most powerful 
and highly organized in Europe, both within and outside the Community. 
- 8 - PE 79.978/fin. 
·m addition to the high rate of excise duty the consumer price is further 
increased by .VAT, which is levied at varying rates (from 5% to 2SX> 
and leads to discrimination between products. 
The Community has removed customs barriers and facilitated the free 
movement of most agricultural products but has failed in its objective 
in the case of wine, which does not circulate freely in the Community 
in the same way as the other products. 
It is therefore rash to refer to wine surpluses, given that more than 
one hundred million European consumers are obliged to pay a price for 
wine which is between five and ten times higher than that obtained 
by the wine-growers. 
This type of situation obviously creates surpluses, a term which would 
be appropriate only if the forces of supply and demand were allowed 
to interact freely. 
The fact that it is precisely those Member States which boycott the 
sale of wine that oppose distillation measures- the only way of 
disposing of millions of hectolitres which are unsaleable- shows the 
absurd point that has now been reached in this sector. 
A further consequence of the high level of excise duties is that, in 
order to lower the selling price, an attempt is made to squeeze the 
producer price, thus encouraging the marketing of poor quality wines 
and thwarting the Community's aim of improving quality. 
The Limited consumption in certain Community countries, resulting from 
the high price of wine, has, together of course with other factors, 
led to the formation of wine surpluses which can be disposed of only 
by means of expensive distillation operations. 
The claim made by countries which levy high excise duties on wine that 
a reduction in these duties would elad to a fall in revenue is groundless, 
since revenue from wine represents a very small proportion of total 
revenue from the principal excise duties and a specific cut in the 
rate could Lead to an increase in revenue encouraging higher consumption. 
PE 79.978 ;fin. 
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D 8 F I DK IRL UK L NL 
Wine 1 3 1 - 4 1 3 2 2 
Beer 2 6 0.7 1 16 24 13 4 1 
This shows clearly that the Member States which. levy the highest excise ·du~ies 
on wine <United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) are those with the greatest 
revenue from beer, which is consumed in larger quantities. Hence a cut in 
the excise.duty on wine could undoubtedly lead to an increase in revenue. 
The European Parliament has frequently denounced this situatio~ Now it is 
for the first time since direct elections tackling it in a specific report 
devoted exclusively to the problem. This comes at a delicate point when 
a decision is awaited from the Court of Justice which should bring to a 
close a lengthy dispute - Case 170/78 - between the Commission and the United 
Kingdom. 
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TAXATION ON WINE 
A - General considerations 
Domestic fiscal legislation is one of those sectors wnich has 
remained completely under the control of the national authorities 
and over which the influence of the Ccmnunity continues to be 
extrenely limited. 
The expansion in recent years of the national budgets has 
compelled the Member States to increase substantially both 
direct and indirect dcmestic taxation. All of them, rroreover, 
are making increasing use of the fiscal levy as an instrument 
of econanic policy. 
Although all matters relating to taxation lie within the 
jurisdiction of the States, it should not be forgotten that 
the Ccmnunity has a certain nurri::ler of objectives, the 
realization of which depends in part on a measure of 
harrronization of the various taxation systems. Tax 
harrronization has a bearing on all the fundarcental goals 
and objecti•Tes of the Treaty, especially those relating to: 
- the establishrrent of a CCitltOil market, in particular 
through freedcm of rrovement for persons, goods, services 
and capital nnd the introduction of mechanisms to ensure 
mat campet~.tion is not distorted within the camon market, 
- 11 - PE 79.978/fin. 
- the progressive approximation of Member States • econanic 
policies, and 
- the establishn'ent of a number of carm:::>n policies • The 
Treaty provides for only three such policies ,for external 
trade, agriculture and transport), but others have been 
adopted, at least in principle, by the Ccmnunity institutions, 
notably in the energy, regional policy and envirorunental 
sectors. 
The rreasures already taken and yet to be taken by the Ccmnunity 
with a view to harnonizing tax legislation have to be 
considered in relation to the achievement of these objectives. 
It is also worth noting the Council resolution of 22 March 
19711, which specifies, inter alia, that: 
'In order to expedite the effective relaxation of the rules 
applicable to the free rroverrent of persons, goods, services and 
capital and the process of econanic interpenetration, the 
Council, acting on a proposal fran the Carrnission and with due 
regard for t."le need to achieve a just balance, shall decide 
on the following: 
- the Community criteria for determining the uniform basis 
for assessing value added tax in confo~ty with the 
Decision of 21 April 1970 o:, the replacement of Me.rnber 
States' financial contributions with the Community's 
own resources, 
- the harrronization of the sphere of application, the basic 
taxable arrount and the procedures for the collection of 
excise duties, particular 1 y those which have an appreciable 
influence on trade, and 
1 OJ C 28 of 27.3.1971 
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- further rreasures fbr be ha.rtronization of catpa.-·1y taxation 
structures. 
Before the end of the first stage, the studies and the 
Can:ni.ssion 1 s proposals concerning the approximation of the 
rates of value added tax and excise duties shall be 
s'l.lbni tted to the Council. 1 
Sate progress has been made towards tax hantonization, partly 
as a result of initiatives of the kind just mentioned, and 
despite the numerous difficulties created by the considerable 
reluctance of each State to discuss taxation matters except 
within the confines of national legislation. 
The States have, for instance, reached agreemant on a number 
of priority objectives such as: 
- the free rrovernent of persons, goods, services and capital, 
- fiscal neutrality in trade, 
- the introduction of rrechanisms to guarantee that there is no 
distortion of competition, and 
- the abolition of tax frontiers. 
In practice, i.rrportant results have been achieved on the 
basis of these objectives, particularly as the rreasures 
adopted to date mostly relate to the structure of taxation 
and basic taxable arcounts. 
Despite the progress made, major differences still remain 
which call into question the very principles on which 
the Catrnuni ty is founded. This report will fran now on 
be concerned with one of those differences. 
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B - Excise duties and Community law 
An excise duty is an indirect tax on the manufacture or 
sale of certain products. '!be highest excise duties are 
levied on mineral oils, alcohol, beer and wine. 
Excise duties account for a substantial proportion of the 
tax revenue of all the Ccmnunity Member States; m effect, 
they are taxes Whose yield depends on a specific rate 
(a nonetary anount) and on the quantity of the product on 
which tax is collected. But why do excise duties on wine 
create so many problems for the Community - a solution to 
which is urgently needed - when they represent an area of/ 
taxation for which the Member State is in principle responsible? 
'!be answer to this question has been given by the Court of 
Justice on a number of occasions in its judgments in a series 
of cases involving the tax arrangerrents applicable to 
spirits in certain Member States1• 
'Within the system of the EEX: Treaty, the provisions of 
the first :md second paragraphs of Article 95 supplerrent 
the provisions on the abolition of customs duties and 
charges having equivalent effect. 'Ibeir aim is to ensure 
free novement of goods between the ~r States in normal 
conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms 
of protection which may result from the application of 
internal taxation which discriminates against products from 
other r-anber States. Article 95 must guarantee the canplete 
neutrality of internal taxation as regar.& competition between 
domestic products and imported products. 
Case 168/78 Commission v France 
Case 169/78 Commission v Italy 
case 171/78 Commission v Denmark 
Case 172/78 Commission v Ireland 
PE 79.978 ;fin. 
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The first paragraph of Article 95 must be interpreted widely 
so as to cover all taxation procedures which conflict with 
the principle of the equality of treatment of domestic 
products and irtported products; it is therefore necessary 
to interpret the concept of 'similar products' with 
sufficient flexibility. It is necessary to consider as 
similar products_ those which have similar characteristics and meet 
the sarre needs fran the point of view of consumers. It is 
therefore necessary to determine the scq;>e of the first 
paragraph of Article 95 on the basis not of the criterion 
of the strictly identical nature of the products but on that 
of their similar and ccrrparable use. 
'!he function of the second paragraph of Article 95 is to 
cover all forms of indirect tax protection in the case of 
products which, without oeing similar within the meaning 
ofthe first paragraph, are nevertheless in competition, 
even partial, indirect or potential, with certain products 
of the importing country. For the purposes of the application 
of that provision 'it is sufficient for the i.rrp:>rted product to 
be in competition with the protected domestic production by 
reason of one or several econcmic uses to which it may be 
put, even though the condition of similarity for the purposes 
of the first paragraph of Article 95 is not fulfilled. 
whilst the criterion indicated in the first paragraph of 
Article 95 consists in the canparison of tax burdens, 
wbe:ther in terms of t:he rate, the rrode of assessment or 
other detailed rules for the application thereof, in view 
of the aifficulty of making sufficiently precise 
canparisons between the products in question, the second 
paragraph of that article is based upon a nore general 
criterion, in other words the protective nature of the 
system of internal taxation. 
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Whilst Ccmmmity law, as it stands at present, does not 
prohibit certain exerrptions or tax concessions, in 
particular so as to enable productions or undertakings 
to continue which would no longer be profitable without 
those special tax benefits because of the rise in production 
costs, the lawfulness of such practices l.S subject to 
the condition that the Member States using those powers 
extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and 
non-protective manner to i.rtported products in the 
sane situation. 
'lbe i.nple.mentation of the programre of harm::>nization laid 
down by Article 99 of the EEC Treaty cannot constitute a 
preliminary to the application of Article 95. Whatever 
the disparities between the national tax systems, Article 9 5 
lays down a basic requirement which is directly linked 
w the prohibition on custcms duties and charges having 
an equivalent effect between the Member States in that it 
intends to eliminate before any harmonization all national 
tax practices which are like}y to create discrimination 
against imported products or to afford protection to 
certain darestic products. Articles 95 and 99 pursue 
different objectives, since Article 95 aims to eliminate 
m the i.rrmediate future discriminatory or protective tax 
practices, whilst Article 99 aims to reduce trade barriers 
arising fran the differences between the national tax 
systems, even where those are applied without discrimination.' 
C - Excise duties on wine 
'Ihe problem posed by the tax arrangerrents :Cor spirits 
\excise duty on alcohol) also arises in the case of wine, 
which is subject to markedly different regulations in 
the Member States both in absolute terms and in comparison 
with beer, its main carpeti tor. 
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Table 1: Canparison between the excise duties applicable to 
wine as at 1.4.1982 {ECU per hl) 
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'nlat there are considerable differences between the rates 
applied becanes imnediately apparent fran this table. M::>re 
i.nportantly, it will be seen that the Member States can be 
divided into three groups: 
- group 1 : states applying zero-rated or very low excise 
duties (Italy, Germany, France and Greece) 
- group 2 states levying a noderate rate of duty (Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) 
- group 3 states levying very high excise duties (United 
Kingdan, Ireland and Denmark) 
!Doked at another way, it will be realized that of these 
groups the first carprises Ccmnunity countries which are 
wine-producers but which also produce beer, the second, 
countries which, with very few exceptions, are beer-producers 
and the third, countries which are exclusively beer-producers. 
Table 2: The average trend of e:xcise duties on wine fran 
1.9.1979 to 1.4.1982 (1.9.1979 = 100) 
D .. B OK F IRL- I L NL UK GR 
84 89 230 302 77 104 168 ~ 
- . - . - - . 
. .... 
Source : Commission of the EC 
'Ibis table reveals that over the past four years the United 
Kingdan and Ireland have further increased their excise 
duties on wine, with the result that the cost to the consUit"er 
has became extremely high - duty accounts for about 40% of 
the retail price of wine. 
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Clearly, such high rates of duty influence per capita 
constmptioo, so much so that, given the differences, it is 
possible to say that a direct relationship exists between 
the excise duty and COilSUlt'ption. 
Table 3: Trends in per capita consurption of wine over the 
decade 1969 to 1979 (in liters> 
Year D F I NL B+L UK IRL DK GR 
1969 16 111 111 5 11 3 2 5 not known 
1979 25 96 82 12 19 7 3 12 not known 
Source : Commission of the EC 
On 5 December 1975 the carmission, aware of the repercussions 
on intra-camn.mity trade in wine, addressed a recarmendation to 
the Member States1 calling for a reduction of the excise 
duties ~~ding the adoption of a harmonization directive. 
'!his recamendation had been disregarded, especially by the 
States belonging to the third, non-producing group. 
D The action brought by the Commission against the United Kingdom 
On 7 September 1978 the Cammission, faced with the continuation 
of an anomalous situation, initiated proceedings against 
the United Kingdom in pursuance of Article 169 of the EEX: 
Treaty, the nature of the alleged infringement being that 
the national provisions relating to the excise duty on 
non-sparkling wines ~re contrary to the second paragraph 
of Article 95 of the Treaty. 
On 27 February 1980 the Court of Justice reserved its right 
to study certain aspects of the case JTOre thoroughly before 
giving a final ruling. 
1 76/2 in OJ L 2 of 7.1.1976 
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Why does the carmission consider that the excise duty regulations 
may be in breach of the second paragraph of Article 95 of the 
EEX: Treaty, which stipulates that 1 no Member State shall irrpose 
on the products of other Merti:>er States any internal taxation of 
such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products 1 ? 
'lhe interpretation generally placed on Article 95 is that danestic 
tax regulations must not be created with a view to ert.cting 
cbstacl~ to trade, not only in respect of inp:>rted products 
which are identical to the danestic product, but also in respect 
of products which are similar to o~ ccxrpetitive with the 
domestic product. 
'lhe prohibition of fiscal discrimination in Article 95 suffers 
no exception, must be regarded as a fundarrental principle of 
the custans union and penni. ts no argunent for either conditional 
application or for subordinating it to interpretative criteria 
outside Ccrrmuni.ty rules. 
'lhe purpose of Article 95 is to guarantee the transparency of 
the market and the neutrality of taxation; it must be recognized 
that this i.nposes limits on the fiscal sovereignty of the 
Merrber States. 
In the deposition sul:xnitted by the carmission in its action 
against the United Kingdan, the concept of ~ting product 
within the meaning of Article 95 must be understood as 
etbracing a series of products which, without being identical 
or similar, are distinguished only by the degree and breadth 
of the differences separating them: the function and distribution 
of the products, their possibilities for use, the price 
differences bet'INeen them and the ecananic link bet'INeen the 
respective sectors of production are just sare of the factors 
that must be considered when assessing the relationship 
between two potentially competitive products. 
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It is obvious that the substitution relationship may be real 
for certain consurcers and only potential for others. 
'nle Ccmnission 1 s contention, which should be supported by 
Parliament, is that this situaticn is confirmed particularly 
when the interpenetraticn of the markets is conditioned by 
fiscal systems \·hlch obstruct the free IOOVe!!tellt of gcods; the 
obstruction is a major one when the taxation is so high that the 
itrported products becane luxury goods - wch is what has 
happened in the case of wine - and their consurtption is thus 
limited to the social strata of the population wch are 
best off - which cannot be condoned. 
Parliarrent should support the Camri.ssion 1 s argurcent that the 
concept of 1substitutionproducts 1 must be defined at Ccmnunity 
level. Such a concept cannot be defined in the light of 
individual preferences l.imi ted to selected regions or by 
reference to a market not yet fully benefiting from the free 
rrovem:nt of goods, without the principles of unifo:rmity and 
equality of treatrrent laid down by the EOC Treaty being respected. 
E - The relationship between wine and beer 
'lbe highest rates of taxation on \Ji.ne are applied by those 
countries which are not wine-producers but producers of beer, 
which explains why they seek to use the fiscal system to 
discriminate in favour of the consurtption of beer to the 
detriment of wine cons\.llll)tion. 
That a carpeti ti ve relationship exists bet-ween wine and beer 
seems beyond dispute. The Ccmnission maintains - and rightly so -
that the question of different places of production is irrelevant: 
- 21 - . PE 79.978/fin. 
''llle geographical distribution of production of beer and 
wine in the various regions of the Carm..mity should facilitate 
and develq:> trade. The place of production may of course 
exercise an influence in favour of the consurrption of local 
products but it does not prevent an evolution of consumer 
preference towards other products caning fran other regions. 
'!be habits of consumers vary in tenns of the q>pertunities 
q:>en to them to get to know and appreciate products other 
than beer. 
Wine artd beer share the sane characteristics: not only are 
they alcoholic drinks obtained by fennentation but they have 
the sane uses {table erinks and thirst-quenching drinks) . ' 
As far as dcmestic consurrption is concerned, wine may be 
considered a substitution product for beer. 
J.l.breover, the taxation of beer poses fewer problems, especial! y 
since all the Member States are producers of beer, whereas only 
five are producers of wine. 
Table 4: World output : wine and beer 
Wine* Beer* 
Italy (1) Germany (.2 ) 
France (2) t'nited Kingdan (3) 
Germany ( 9) France (9) 
Greece (13) Netherlands (14) 
Luxembourg ( 4 2 ) Belgium ( 15) 
Italy (20) 
*the figures in brackets Denmark ( 22) 
indicate the position ~reland ( 27) 
occupied by each State reece (39) 
on the world production Luxembourg {51) 
ladder. 
Source: Commission of the EC 
----
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.BEER 
- at 7°35 Plato 
- at 11° Plato 
- at 12°5 Plato 
- at 13°75 Plato 
- at 16° Plato 
The excise duties levied by each Ma~ State on the various 
types of beer were as follows at 1 April l982l(ECU/HECTOLITRE) 
B D !]( F G3 m. I L t\L 
4.02-6.34 3.76-4,70 37.79 1.76 36.55 64.37 5.58 1.$-3,09 9.25-ll.69 
6.02-9.49 5,01-6,26 47.19 1,76 53.61 94.42 8,35 2,82-4,62 13,83-17.48 
6,84-10.79 5,01-6,26 47.19 3.12 60.92 107.31 9.49 3.21-5.25 15.71-19.89 
7,53-11,87 5.01-6.26 56.01 3,12 67.02 118,03 10.44 3,53-5,78 17.29-21.88 
8.76-13.81 7.51-9.39 56,01 3.12 . 77,'3/J 137,34 P-2.15 4.11-6,72 20,ll-25,45 
Source : Commission of the EC 
A comparison in absvlute terms would obviously be meaningless. 
The rate of duty per volume or the rate of duty per degree 
of alcoholic strength can form the basis of a comparative 
assessment, but in either case the results always show wine 
to be at a disadvantage. 
In all its recent major reports, Parliarrent has consistently 
called for the harmonization of excise duties on wine. -~ 
ffi 
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F - The judgment of the Court of Justice 
On 12 July 1983, the Court delivered its judgment on what may well 
be one of the longest cases it has ever dealt with. The procedure 
·- ---------------------
for the case was opened by a letter of 14 July 1976 from the 
Commission initiating proceedings for the violation of Article 95(2) 
of the Treaty. Following its first interlocutory judgment of 
27 February 1980, the Court reached a final decision on 12 July 1983. 
This judgment is exemplary from several points of view and provides 
a clear and objective answer to all the questions raised during the 
hearings, which were summarized in the first part of this report. 
Competitive relationship betwe·en wine and beer 
With regard to the competitive relationship between wine and beer, 
the Court maintained that the two beverages in question were 'capable 
of meeting identical needs'. It must therefore be acknowledged that 
there is a degree of substitution for one another. 'For the purpose 
of measuring the possible degree of substitution, attention should 
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not be confined to consumer habits in a Member State ••• the tax 
policy of a Member State must not therefore crystallize given con-
sumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by national 
industries concerned to respond to them.' 
Finally, after a detailed analysis of the various methods for com-
paring wine and beer, the Court decided in the final analysis that 
'the decisive competitive relationship between beer, a popular and 
widely consumer beverage, and wine must be established by reference 
to those wines which are the most accessible to the public at large, 
that is to say, generally speaking, the lightest and cheapest 
varieties'; accordingly, that is the appropriate basis for making 
fiscal comparisons by reference to the alcoholic strength or to 
the price of the two beverages in question. 
Determination of an appropriate tax ratio 
Although this was the most delicate and most decisive aspect of the 
whole lengthy case, the Court, delivering its decision with great 
clarity, came to the conclusion that a considerably higher tax burden 
is placed on precisely those wines which, in view of their price, 
are most directly in competition with domestic beer production. The 
Court therefore reached the conclusion that 'the United Kingdom's 
tax system has the effect of subjecting wine imported from other 
Member States to an additional tax burden so as to afford protection 
to domestic beer production, inasmuch as beer production constitutes 
the most relevant reference criterion from the point of view of 
competition. Since such protection is most marked in the case of the 
most popular wines, the effect of the United Kingdom tax system is 
to stamp wine with the hallmarks of a luxury product, which, in view 
of the tax burden which it bears, ~an scarcely constitute in the eyes 
of the consumer a genuine alternative to the typical domestically 
produced beverage.' 
On the basis of all these considerations, the Court found the United 
Kingdom guilty of having failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
second paragraph of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty, which was signed 
by the Government of the United Kingdom on 22 January 1972. 
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Conclusions 
In concluding this report it was necessary to mention the judgment 
of the Court and we have done so without offering any particular 
comments. In any case, the judgment is exemplary in its clarity. 
There is now a significant legal gap which the Community must fill. 
The situation as regards this domestic taxation system, which acts 
as a barrier to the free movement of goods, has now changed. A 
solution must be found and to this end Parliament must press the 
Commission to pursue its efforts within the Council of Ministers to 
find an acceptable solution. Although it is improbable, given the 
strength of the beer lobby, that the price of wine will fall drastic-
ally in those countries in which it is over-taxed, it is vital to 
find a flexible and long-term solution in order to restore stability 
to the situation. The present report does not wish to take sides, 
only to see that justice, as expressed in the Court's reasoned 
judgment, is restored in the interests above all of the Community's 
consumers, between whom no discrimination should exist. Wine, which 
Like beer is a popular beverage, should be accorded equal treatment 
in the various countries of the Community and should not be considered 
a popular drink in some countries as a result inter alia of aid from 
the Community's agricultural policy, while in others it is considered 
a luxury product practically inaccessible to all but the most affluent 
group of consumers. 
In conclusion, in adopting this resolution Parliament must not only 
endorse the judgment of the Court of Justice but must also lay the 
foundations for a solution to this problem, not only in the legal 
interest, which requires the governments to comply with the rulings 
of the Court, but also in the interests of economic justice between 
the Member States of the Community. 
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